We discuss Humphreys' article in the context of two challenges that exist in regards to futureresearch on the link between action and attention: (1) determining the cognitive and neural mechanisms responsible for an action-attention link and (2) demonstrating that the action-attention links observed in the laboratoryr eflect the same links between action and attention observed in the complexities of everydaylife.
article 'The interaction of attention and action: Froms eeing action to acting on perception' summarizes ac omplexa nd fascinating relationship between human visual attention and potential foraction on objects. Humphreys' review discusses am ulti-facetted approach to investigatingt his relationship, including behavioural studies with healthy and brain-damaged individuals,aswell as investigations involving the use of imaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related potentials.H umphreys also leadsat hought-provoking discussion on possible mechanisms underlying this relationship,r aising important issuesofb roadt heoretical interest.
Considering the importance and novelty of this line of research, we hope that the article by Humphreys et al. (2010) will serve as ac atalyst forf uture investigations to move beyond simply cataloguing instances where attention and action affordancesare linked. Humphreysc ase is made, and the challenges are now to (1) determine the cognitive and neural mechanisms responsible fora na ction-attention link and (2) demonstrate that the action-attention links observedinthe laboratoryreflect the same links between action and attention observed in the complexities of everyday life.
Regarding this first challenge,muchofHumphreys' own workisinspired by various disorderso fv isual attention, such as visual-spatial neglect, yeti ti st he experiences of these patients that raise questions about the anatomy underlying the action-attention relationship. Forexample, neglect patient M. P. introspected that he is better able to find objectsinhis neglected field whenhethinks of how the object is used.Thisanecdotal account was supportedb yc ontrolled experiments performed by Humphreys and Riddoch (2001) ,w hich showed that M. P. was indeed better at finding targets in his neglected field whenthose targets wereidentifiedbyanassociated action compared to when theyw ere identified by name. Similarly,F ortia nd Humphreys (2008) found that healthy individuals weremoreaffectedbyobject orientationwhen theysearched fora target on the basis of the object's function compared to the object's name.
What is of particular interest herei st hat patient M. P. ,w ith damaget ot he parietal lobes and associated dorsal 'action' stream, benefits from action-related cueing rather than semantic or object identity cueing, which are traditionally thought of as ventral stream functions. Put more simply,M .P .i su sing actioni nformation over object information even though his action system is compromised! Upon closer inspection, M. P.'s lesions actuallyextend to parts of the ventral stream, including the temporal lobes (Humphreys &R iddoch, 2001) , suggesting that his ventral object recognition stream may also be compromised. This leaves alluring questions about the relative contribution of these two neural systems to object processing, action, and attention. Interestingly, two other parietal lobe patients in the Humphreys and Riddoch study,M.B.and G. K., did not show the same advantages as M. P. foraction cues. BecauseM.P .' suse of action cues was similar to that of healthyp articipants in Fortia nd Humphreys (2008) , it suggests that M. P.'s abilities may be supportedb yp reserved, normal, functional pathways, while these systems may be compromised in M. B. and G. K. Investigations into the relative locations of the lesions in these patients could therefore be particularly informative with regards to normal dorsal/parietal lobe functiona nd its contribution to attention.
Similar to the results regarding neglect patient M. P. ,C astiello, Scarpa, and Bennett (1995)f ound that simultanagnosic patient L. P. showed uncoordinated movements when tryingt ob ring together cards representingt wo unrelated objectsb ut showed improved coordination when the objectsw ere related. L. P. has bilateralp arietal damage, and therefore, like M. P. ,M.B., and G. K.,one can reasonably infer that there is damagetoher action pathways. How then, is she performing these coordinated actions?
To explaint hese paradoxicalr esults, Humphreys et al. (2010) suggests that these abilitiesmay be accounted forinone of two ways: (a)adaptation following the lesion or (b) the novel use of aresidual system.Humphreys also suggests that these results would not be informative about attentional processes in normal populations.Considering the link between M. P. and L. P.'s behaviour and the behaviour of healthy individuals (Forti & Humphreys, 2008) , perhapsthe patient behaviour is more informative to healthy brain function than may be immediately apparent. The issueo fh ow the damaged brain is linking action foro bjectsw ith visual attention (i.e.t hrough adaptation vs. the use of residual system)i so fg reat interest with regards to the functioning of the visual attentional system, as well as recoveryf rom brain damage, and brain plasticity. Humphreys' first alternative, the ideao fa daptation from brain damage, can be investigated through behavioural tests with patients who are tested soon after injury. Apatient whose brain has not had time to adapt can informusabout whether adaptation is necessaryf or the link betweenp otential fora ction and attention to be restored. Indeed, it is not even clear from current researchthat this link is necessarily lost.
If the action-attention link in parietal patients is not related to adaptation, (i.e. patients with recent damaget ot he dorsal 'action's tream show behavioural evidence of connections betweenv isual attention and potential fora ction),t his might support the second alternative, the use of as o-called 'residual system'. The ideao f aresidual system is often suggested when other anatomical explanations do not fit with our currentu nderstanding of brain function. However,t he existence of ap reserved connection betweena ttentiona nd actioni np arietal patients could have important theoretical implications forbrain function and anatomy and is worthinvestigating. One possible avenue forsuch an investigation is diffusion tensorimaging (DTI): the imaging of white matter in the brain, which allows fora nalysis of location, direction, and orientation of parallel bundles of myelinated axons (Basser,Mattiello, &LeBihan, 1994) . Implemented in this context, DTI might allow the direction of information flow to be traced when the action/attention link is made. Combined with fMRI, this technique could reveal whether patients are using the samebrain areas to performaction-related tasks as healthyindividuals, or whether new connections are made. More broadly,this would provide useful information about how the brain formsn ew connections when old connections are lost.
Afi nal point of interest regarding cognitive and neural mechanisms is raised in the last section of Humphreys' review.H ere, he sketches out two ways that action may impactattention: statistical learning and motor feedback. Thismotivates more questions aboutt he anatomy underlying these processes. For example, is statistical learning specific to ac ertain areas of the brain, or is it am ore distributed function? If it is distributed, this may explainw hy the action-attentionl ink is preservedi np atients like M. P. and L. P. ,but begs the question as to why it may be lost in-patients M. B. and G. K. It will be interesting to see what inroads are made on these possibilities in the next several years.
Regarding the second challenge associatedw ith ouru nderstandingo ft he relationship between action and attention, i.e. the connection between laboratory and real-world circumstances, it is sobering to note that there is little, if any,e vidence that the results of the experiments described by Humphreys et al. (2010) are predictive or explanatoryofaction-attentionlinksineverydaylife. If one accepts the main thrust of Humphreys paper -and we certainly do -that actionaffects attention, then it is also the case that laboratory-based findings are rarely (if ever) going to generalize to the more complexr eal-life situations in which many more actions are being performed and signalled forthan when aperson is in the laboratory. In reallife, there are many actions that may be in operation, and many objectsvying forotheractions, that are not typically in play in the laboratory. Forinstance,when one walks into akitchen to prepare some food, one is performing many actions with the body,i ncluding moving through space, swinging arms and legs, and possibly turning the trunk, head, and eyes, while concurrently selecting the items necessaryt oa chieveo ne'sg oal (Land, 2004) .T he challenge forresearchersistotest when there is alink between laboratoryand life, and when there is not. Tooo ften there is the implicit,i fn ot explicit, assumption that the findings in the laboratorywill be informative to the ones in real life. Indeed, even in the fews ituations when ar eport from ar eal-life experiencep redicts an effect that is observed in the laboratory(as is the case with M. P. )itisstill very much aleap of faith that the laboratoryresult is tapping into the same mechanisms that mediate the real-life report. (This becomes even more so forf ollow-up paradigm-driven studiesa nd manipulations; it is an extraordinaryl eap of faith to think that subsequent laboratorybased manipulations on the laboratory-based paradigm are stillmaking contact with the originalbehaviour that motivated the original study). Thisline of argument has been put forward recently by Kingstone (Kingstone, 2009; Kingstone, Smilek, &Eastwood, 2008) ands tressest he importance of establishinga nd testing the link between cognitive/behavioural researcha nd real-life situations.
We are encouragedbythe growing body of evidence compiled by Humphreys et al. (2010) supporting the link betweenhuman visual attention and action. We hope more progress will be madeo nt his line of worki nt he future, specifically with regards to understanding the mechanisms underlying this link and its operation in the realworld. Various tools in the laboratoryc an help us understandt he mechanisms, but these mechanisms are only meaningful if theya re put into action in the real world.
